AUMF enaction would be dangerous
In 2002, a young state senator from the 13th district of Illinois had this to say about former President George W. Bush’s proposed war in Iraq: “I don’t oppose all wars. What I am opposed to is a dumb war. What I am opposed to is a rash war.”
As he spoke, the nation hurdled towards war in Iraq and was already fighting in Afghanistan. Bush would justify both wars with the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force, a law passed just seven days after 9/11.
This week, that same state senator, now the president, has asked Congress for a new AUMF, this time to wage war against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, despite having ordered against fighting ISIS for the last six months. The politics of “act now, and ask permission later” must end, but for Congress to pass such an authorization would be a dangerous reversion to the state of the dumb and rash Middle East war that has defined the 21st century. Political realities necessitate that leaders look strong amid the beheadings and chaos wrought upon the Middle East by ISIS, but to authorize further force would exude remarkable closed-mindedness and signify another careless cession of war powers to the executive branch.
Like Obama, I also don’t oppose all wars. My grandfather captained a landing craft in the Pacific theater of World War II, and from Iwo Jima to Okinawa, he would run his ship onto the beach and deploy up soldiers. In combat, the average lifespan of a captain like him, standing on the bridge, was 18 minutes.
That war was against a well-defined enemy on a well-defined battlefield. The target of the latest AUMF is neither. If enacted, it would give Obama authority to use the Armed Forces against ISIS and “associated forces,” defined as “individuals and organizations fighting for, on behalf of, or alongside ISIS or any closely-related successor entity in hostilities against the [United States] or its coalition partners.”
Such a nebulously defined target is problematic: consider the case of the 2001 AUMF, which authorized force against “nations, organizations, or persons he [the president] determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 9/11, or harbored such organizations or persons.” This seemed like a reasonable restriction, until Obama justified the current air strikes against ISIS under the 2001 AUMF, despite very little evidence (including their complete disownment by Al Qaeda) that they are related to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
The lack of a clearly defined enemy is compounded by the lack of any geographical limitation on executive power under the new AUMF. It makes the entire world — including the United States — a battlefield over which the executive branch would be legally able to use force, despite international law that prevents the use of force in another sovereign nation without that nation’s consent. The new AUMF merely repeats and entrenches the idea that the United States must serve as the world’s unlawful police force. In short, it is the same ideology that led us into Iraq.
Adding to the mess is a “sunset” provision within the draft, which states that the AUMF will expire three years after its enactment. If passed tomorrow, the AUMF’s power would extend for over a year into the term of the next president, a frightening possibility. While Obama might be trusted to use continued limited force, such an AUMF in the hands of a Marco Rubio or other extremist war hawk is too large a price to pay.
A new AUMF also begs the question: why will a fresh round of military power do anything to prevent ISIS from cropping up elsewhere, or another just as radical organization from taking its place? When Al Qaeda was defeated in Afghanistan, they cropped up in Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula. A decade later, they still haven’t been defeated. The flaw of Middle East policy is the mistaken belief that dropping bombs can quash radical ideologies. In six months, according to the Pentagon, coalition-led airstrikes have gained just one percent of ISIS’s territory.
The real solution to defeating ISIS is to reform the fundamental political exclusion of Sunni minorities by Shiite governments across the Middle East. In Iraq, for example, many Sunnis radicalized and joined ISIS because they were ostracized by Iraq’s Shiite-led government. It is Obama’s duty to restart efforts to encourage political reform in Iraq’s government and condemn the exclusion of Shiite groups by other governments like Saudi Arabia, even if they are our allies. While repairing the Sunni-Shiite political divide is undoubtedly more difficult than ordering airstrikes, it is a far more comprehensive solution.
In 2009, Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his vision of “international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples.” Those values should be supported — but not selectively. If the president signs a new AUMF, especially under the rosy and shamefully misleading banner of “inherent resolve,” he should send his Nobel Prize back to Oslo.
Nathaniel Haas is a junior majoring in political science and economics. His column, “State of the Union,” runs Fridays.