U.S. has no place mobilizing Syrian troops

In response to Syria’s four years of civil war, the impending growth of possible genocide and one of the worst refugee crises, the United States seeks to counter terrorism with militarism. Yet their program to train Syrian forces has been delayed and met with one obstacle after another. For months, the United States has planned the launch of a training program, but as the social and political volatility of the area suggests, this attempt in securitizing Syria will never succeed. Though the priority to take down the Islamic State is a noble one, it is steeped in the far-right baseless optimism of military power and its supremacy in handling foreign policy. In doing so, the United States is not only setting up the Syrian forces to fail, but it also is detrimental to both forces, inadvertently giving ISIS the political capital it needs to further decimate its adversaries.

All of this considered, it is critical to assess the great world power driving this effort. Disregarding the myths of American exceptionalism, nothing legitimizes the United States to play such a role in the Middle East. Looking past the social and cultural understandings of the United States and its role in intervention, the nation’s history of hands-off military engagement, spotty enforcement of provisions abroad and apathetic involvement in genocide prevention deem the United States an unreliable actor.

In terms of logistics, this plan needs a concrete and structural commitment between the rebel forces and the United States, both of whom have a capricious track record. The poorly monitored funding of rebel troops in Iraq and Afghanistan is a key factor in understanding the rise of fundamental Islam. Another push by the United States could drastically change the balance of power in the Middle East, where ISIS and other terrorist organizations have the upper hand.

A social contract of support and the mobilization of about 5,000 Syrian troops in the course of 12 months is not nearly enough considering its opposition, ISIS. Also, both the United States and Syrian forces inadvertently act according to their special interests, which for the rebel troops will most likely be geared toward the dismantling the Assad regime. This type of tactless foreign policy is a recipe for complete chaos. The slight chance of this plan’s success does not supersede the deep repercussions of further instability in the Syrian region.

So-called solutions to the ISIS problem are doomed to fail because they are not addressing the core issue at hand. The administration needs to consider why a country such as Syria is so susceptible to the hold of Islamic Fundamentalism; the answer lies in the extremists that are internalizing terrorism and oppressing civilians into the political system in the Middle East. Systemic issues require diplomatic, long-term changes. Leaving the question of “what to do with ISIS” to be answered by militants is like confining a safe zone to marginal men: It is a ticking time bomb.

Currently, the United States is tending to the Syrian civilian crisis and the growing influence in power of a huge terrorist organization. Arguably, the United States is seeing the same war in the Middle East over and over again; this is a repeat of Iraq and Afghanistan. Time and time again, the government disregards terrorism and its detriments as a local issue. It is a direct result of what happens when a governing entity cannot provide fundamental and cosmopolitan rights to its people. Mobilizing rebel forces is simply a temporary fix with long-term blowbacks for the intervening forces, ensuring hostility for the citizen sector and serious anxieties over inevitable spill-overs in regional areas.

The physical delays of the program are a sign that the United States should not mobilize rebel forces but instead empower them with the educational, socioeconomic and cultural needs of which they are deprived.